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Private Pensions and Public Pensions:
Theory and Fact
ABSTRACT
An economic theory of public and private pensions is
developed, and the implications of the theory are compared
with some empirical evidence, of both the econometric and
casual varieties. Among the questions addressed are: why
are there private pensions? why have they grown so rapidly
in recent decades? why do they have the particular features
that they do? why does the government intervene by regulating
the provisions of private pensions and mandating a public
pension system? what are the effects of private and public







The extraordinary growth of both private and public
pensions is one of theoutstandingdevelopments of the postwar
American economy. As late as 1950, only 59% of the labor force
was covered by social security; by 1975, 8% were covered.
Social security benefit payments were only $3 billion un 1980
dollars) in 1950; by 1980, they were up to $119 billion.
Private pension growth has also been explosive:
coverage doubled from 1950 to1975.1 Contributions to private
pension plans increased from $2 billion (or $5 billion in1975
prices) to $32 billion over this same period, and the fraction
by 2 of payroll expenses accounted for by pensions rose/about one half.
All this amounts to a major structural change in the nature of
employee compensation.
Recently, there has been a great outpouring of public
policy interest in our nation's pension system. Social security
has been examined and reexamined repeatedly over the past decade.
Some sort of major overhaul is all but inevitable because the
probably
system/is not financially viable as presently constituted, and
several suggestions for sweeping reform have been made. Recent years
have also witnessed important public policy interventions into
1Thepercentage of tflelabor forcecovered by aprivate
pensionplan rose from 16%to 33%. Thepercentage ofprivate wage and salary workers covered rose from2% toO%.See
}otiikoft and Smith (forthcoming).
4Snecifically, itwas3.l in 1951 ar: 5.5% i: 1975.
icc(ot1ikoffand Smith (forthcoming).2.
theprivate pension system. The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 19714 (ERISA) imposed a web of regulations on
private pensions. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1977
raised the minimum age for mandatory retirement. Both of these
acts represent' substantial efforts by government to alter the
equilibrium that arises from a free market in pensions.
Several sets of questions are raised by these
questions that provide the outline for this paper.
(1) Why are thereprivatepensions? Why have they
grown so much in recent decades? And why do the have the
features that they do? (Section 3)
(2) What are the economic effects of pensions? On
the surface, this would seem to be a well-formulated question
for a publicly-imposed pension plan, but a nonsensical question
for pension arrangements that arise voluntarily through markets.
However, I will argue that the differences between private and
public pensions in this respect are not nearly as sharp as
simpleminded economic theory might suggest. (Section '4)
(3)Why intervene in the Dension system? Why should
wehave a publicly-imposed pension system (social security)
instead of relying on the free market? And why should we pass
laws to regulate and change the face of the private pension
system? (Section 5)
Thisis a long list of justions. While I will try to
provide tentative ansars to all of them, readers should interpret
these answers as working hypotheses whcii,ivenwht we now3.
know,seem plausible. Each and every answer offered here should he sub
jected to further theoretical scrutiny and subsequent empirical
verification or falsification.
2. What is a Pension?
Before weplungeinto the preceding list of questions,
it is useful to think at a fairly fundamental level about precisely
what a pension is. I find it useful to think of a pension plan
as a bank account with a number of peculiar features. For
example:
1. The worker normally cannot withdraw money from his
account until lie reaches a certain age.
2. The worker must leave his firm in order to start
making withdrawals.
3. The amount of money that can be withdrawn may deuend
not only on howmuchhas been "deposited," but also on the
life—cycle time patterns of both wages and hours of work.
That is, most workers have defined benefit, not defined contribution,
1
pension plans.
11n a defined benefitplan, benefitsare related to
earnings in some particular years (example: benefits might be
a fraction of earnings during the lastfive years of employment).
In a defined contribution plan (like TIAA-CREF), some portion
of wages is invested in a fund, and benefits depend on the
earningsof the fund's investments. In 1977, almost three-quarters
ofworkercovered by private pensions were in defined benefit
plans even though the inalorityof planswere derined contribution
plans. (The defined benefit plans are, cn average, much larger.) dKotlikoffand Smith (forthcoming).LI..
Li.Only a small fraction (often zero) of the accumulated
balance in the account can be taken asa lumpsum payment upon
retirement. For the most part, withdrawals must takethe form
of annuity payments. Thus use of this bankaccount is tied
to the purchase of insurance against longevity.
5. A worker who leaves his firm too soon (before the
pension is "vested") may lose the entire balance in hisaccount.
6. Pensions are very often not "portable" fromone
employer to another.
7. Individual workers typically have no discretionover
how much is deposited into their pension account.
While not every private pension plan has each of these
features, they are quite typical. These aspects of pensions,
all of which need explaining, have several fairly obvious
implications.
First, items 1, 2, and 14 imply that saving in the pension
fund is almost uniquely suited to retirementpurposes. Pension
wealth normally cannot be used for bequests (except for inter-
spousal transfers), does not provide a precautionary balance
that can be used •for a "rainy day' and probably does not confer
what might be called "King Midas henefits"--thepower and
psychological satisfaction that some people derive from
accumulation of wealth. For these reasons and others, it is
unlikely that private pension wealth is a perfect substitute
for furigiblewealth.5.
Second, items 5 and 6 imply that pensions create a cost
of changing jobs that would not exist in their absence.
They thereby reduce labor mobility, arid probably not by accident.
Third, items 2 and 3 strongly suggest that a pension
plan might distort the life-cycle pattern of labor supply,
including the decision to retire.
Each of these suggestions will be considered at length
in Sections 3 and .But,first, I conclude this section by
comparing our public pension system-—social security-—with the
list of stylized facts about private pensions.
1. Social security benefits also cannot be drawn before
a certain age (either 62 or 65).
2. A worker does not have to leave his firm to collect
benefits, but most workers will have to reduce their hours of
work sharply in order to collect.
3. Social security is a defined benefit plan, similar
to many private pensions.
tt.Socialsecurity retirement benefits are paid strictly
as annuities, though these are ourrently indexed annuities.
5. Social security benefits are vested after a minimum
period in covered employment (now10years).
6. Social security pensions are completely portable
within the covered sector (which by now encompasses the vast
majority of the private sector).
7. Workers have absolutely no discretion over the level
ofcontrIbutions" to social security.
1ithout trying to addresG the chickeri—eg problem uivLil late, I
suggest that the main fact that emerges from this comparison is
ih Jrni1rity botween social security and pfivate pensions,6.
not the difference.
3. The Economic Theory of Pensions
Why are there private pensions, and why do they have the
features that they have?
3.1AModigliani-Niller Theorem for Pensions
It is easy enough to see that in the frictionless and
rather barren world of standard neoclassical economictheory,
pensions uould simply be irrelevant. That is,np worker would
care howmuch(if any) of his earnings were deposited into the
pension fund; for every dollar accumulated in the pension fund,
the workerwouldsimply reduce his private wealth holdings by
$1; lifetime work patterns, and in particular the retirement
decision? would be unaffected by pensions.
The "proof" of what might be called the neutrality of
pensions follows rather simply from five assumptions.
Al: There is no uncertainty of any kind.
A2: There are no taxes, no governmentally_imposedpension
system, and no laws regulating private pensions.
A3: Capital markets are perfecc.
ALT: Every worker is paid, in the form of explicitwages
(w) plus contributions to his pension fund (p), an amount
precisely equal •to the value of his marginal product. (Implicit
in this statement are the notions that pensions are defined
entrbiitionnlannand tha.t theahormarket i a snot market.)9.
3.2 Reasons for the Nonexistence of Pensions
Now I begin to add some realistic ingredients, and stir
the soup. The aspects of realism added in this section strongly
suggest not only that pensions are notneutral,but that pensions
should not exist! This may seem strange, since we know that
private pensions do exist. But it is worth recalling that,
for all practical purposes, private pensions were of minor importance in
the days before social securityJ A good theory should explain
not only why pensions now exist (and have grown rapidly), but
also why there were so few before World War II.
Imperfect_Capital_Markets
Under the assumptions of the irrelevance proposition,
workers and firms are both indifferent among all combinations of
constant.
w÷ and Pt that keep w +IGraphically,firms and
workers both have "indifference curves" that look like the straight
line AB in Figure 1. There are many real-world complications
that interfere with this simple picture. 'The first one I will
consider is an imperfect capital market.
One type of imperfection is that the interest rate earned
on lcding maybe lessthan that paid on borrowing. Another -type
a
is that/person whose assets are below some lower limit (possibly
zero) may be denied credit. The basic point is that
'For example, in1939there were only659qualified -:ivet. I::os:cnplans.Cr compareseri. in 1280there were6l6,6'42
soF ler e!See YljkrjFf aJ nith (forLLemieg) o'aver,it
iieiythat 'there were more ueneianplansi ri1929 than in 1939.




when capital markets are imperfect, pensions are no longer a
perfect substitute for private financial assets.
To see why, consider the case of a worker who has Pt
deposited into his pension fund and seeks to borrow against it.
If he must pay an interest rate r' ,whichis higher than the
rate at which the pension fund is accumulating Cr), he will owe
+rI)R_±when the loan comes due, hut will receive only
+r)R_tfrom the pension fund. He therefore cannot borrow
enough to duplicate the consumption pattern of a worker who has
no pension . Inmore extreme cases, he may not be able to
borrow at all. Such a worker will not want a pension.
So capital market imperfections can destroy the neutrality
of pensions. But this need not happen. First, capital market
constraints may not be binding. If the forced pension savings
are always less than what the worker would have saved on his
own anyway, then the pension remains irrelevant. Curve ACD
in Figure 1 is the indifference curve for a worker subject to
borrowing constraints. To the left of C, the constraints are
not binding. But as the pension grows bigger it creates more
and more burdensome constraints on his consumption, and so
becomes progressively less valuable. So tTS.iall.pensionsremoin
neutral, but "big" ones are not.
-
Second,however, and more fundamentally, the
size of the pension plan is a choice variable negotiatcd between
the worker and the firm. One would expect wcrkers to shun
rfl:1onHans that push them hn7ond nt C.Thrd ,wemust
nalance those imperfections against the economics in transactionsii.
costs and diversification that a pension fund can achieve for
a worker—investor, and the fact that pension funds can purchase
annuities on better terms than individuals can. These too are
capital market imperfections, but they enhance, rather than
detract from, the attractiveness of pensions. On balance, then,
capital market imperfections moy not be terribly important for
some workers.
Uncertainty
The reader may have noticed that nothing inmy specification
of a frictionlss world required that pensions he vested,
portable, or funded; these characteristics are irrelevant under
certainty. But vesting, funding, and mortality risk become
quite important once uncertainty is introduced. To keep things
simple at first, I ignore capital market imperfections and assume
risk neutrality. Pension assets present three types of risk: the
risk of death before benefits are received; the risk of bankruptcy
before benefits are vested and funded;. and the risk of quitting or
being fired before benefits are vested. Because of these risks,
the expected value to the worker of a l contribution to his
pension fund is only some number A 1
If workers and firms have the same expectations, this is also
the firm's expected cost of a $1 pension contribution and uncertainty
does not interfere with the neutrality proposition. The worker's12.
indifferencecurves and the firm's isocost curves would both be
as shown by AE in Figure 2 instead of AB: pensions would be
less valuable than straight wages to workers, but also less costly
to firms.
But animportantasymmetry enters if workers are risk
averse while firms are risk neutral.1 Then firms continue to
view X as the cost of a $1 pension contribution, but workers
view the value as:
xE OX w
where 0 <1 is a risk discount factor that probably
gets deeper as the size of thepension grows.2 If so, worker
indifference curves will be convex, as inFigure 2; the contract
curvewill correspond to the vertical axis; andthe "optimal
pension"will be zero.3
An empirical pointrelevant to interpreting the time series
dataarises here. One of the outstanding facts of macroeconomic
his-tory is -that the business cycle has been far tamer in the
postwarperiod than in the prewar period. The risk of bankruptcy
must therefore have been lower in the postwar period. It would
1Thisis just a strong form of the eminently reasonable
proposition that workers are more risk averse than firms.
2ewilldepend, among other things, on the covariance between
the r1urri on the pension contribution and the returns on other risky assets heldby the worker (including his human capital). If
thiscovaniance is negative enough (forexample, ifthe major risk
is that his wage in alternative employment might rise, inducing him to leave the firm before vesting), then 0could exceed
unity.I assume that this is riot the case in Figure 2, but the
argument that follows does not rest on this assumption.
3Nte thai: thesource of the nonexistence of nensios
not urlcerLainty, but an asymmetry arising from risk
fsynmer'yCOUJ d arise for other reasons as well.
rTnc:fie:c CL eldbe nore ctir:yLiC dhutcbs firm's n cci di, in iL tunicCe Ch e ,it rajdo ts plnrr on tha upticn that
Tflw1.l sUr7.ve. n'rTh'- ze-luroblems in L-trc-t the : rm can influence the probability




not surprise me if perceived bankruptcy risk had fallen
steadily over the period, say, from 1950 to 19714.If so, then e
wasprobably rising. If these surmises are
correct, then the principle reason for not having a pension
plan was growing weaker over time. This may be one factoi
contributing to the postwar growth of pensions.
3.3 Reasons for the Existence of Pensions
But surely we can do better than this, and isolate some
affirmative reasons why workers and firms would want pensions.
I startwiththe workers, and with some obvious tax incentives
favoringpensions.
Tax Advantages
First, and most important,by placing a portion Pt of
total compensation into a pension fund, the worker can defer
taxes.Especially, forworkers car
fromretirement, this deferral can amount to an enormous saving
because assets in a pension fund accumulate at the tax-free
rate of interest, r, while savings in standard financial assets
accumulate, at the after-tax rate of interest, r(l-T). (Here t
isTheincometax rate prior to retirement.) Specifically, $1
of earnings that is taxed, and then placed in a bank account,
grows to (l-T)[l ÷ r(1_T)]t at retirement. But l that
is placed in a pension fund andtaxed(at rate T') when14.
it is withdrawn grows to (1-T1)(1 +r)R_t
Second, when the tax is finally paid at retirement, no payroll
tax is due and most workers will be in lower tax brackets than
they were during their major earnings years. So i' < -r for most,
workers and some of the tax is not merely deferred, but actually
rescinded.
Table 1 indicates the tax savings from a pension fund
for various values of r, -r,
andR-t under the assumption that Tt =T—.10.The tax
advantage of pensions is often quite impressive.
Putting this factor into the context of the previous
discussion, the worker's marginal valuation of a $i pension
contribution rises to:
kOX
where some sample values of k ,thetax factor, are given in
thanunity,
Table 1.Since k can be much greater / cannow be
larger than 1.0 for workers who are young or in high tax brackets;
and it is certainly quite possible that > X. A demand
for pensions will arise whenever kO > 1 ,whichwill happen
when workers are highly taxed and not too risk averse.1
Figure 3showshow an optimal pension can he determined
in this case. The worker's indifference curves, which looked
like AD before the tax distortion entered, now look like AF
instead. The outimal division of total compensation between
and will nowbe defined by a tangencybetween an
indifferencecurve like AF andanisocost line like AE.
1Theaverage ageof ernrloyeeshas an ambiguous effect.
On the one hand, young workers have higher' k, ceteris paribus.
But on the other' hariu they will be farther from the vesting

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figureshows what the resulting "contract curve" might look
like. It no longer lies along the vertical axis.
Once again, some pertinent empirical observations can be
for very high income
made. Except I workers, the tax distortions favoring pensions
over straight wages were negligible prior to World War II simply
because the income tax was negligible. This is a major d*fference
between the prewar and postwar periods which helps explain why
pensions were absent before World War II and blossomed thereafter.'
income and payroll
In addition, typical marginal/tax rates on earnings have
increased over the postwar period, thus exacerbating the tax
advantage. More importantly, nominal interest rates have
increased phenomenally. You can see in Table 1 that tLe tax
advantage of pensions is greater at higher nominal interest
rates. Finally, it is fascinating to observe that the growth
in private pensions seems to have slowed during the second half
of the 1970s--just about the time that Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRA's) enabled workers to avail themselves of the
same tax benefits without formal pensions.2
Pensions and LaborTurnover
The tax structure can explain whyworkersmight demand
nensionplans. There are also, however, motives forfirms to
Inaddition, i92 amendments to the Internal Revenue Code
clarified the conditions under which pension contributions were
tax deductible business exponsos to firms desnite rot bing taxed
a pe:o al Tine rrs to dSOUl tm rat hLOhnsv
nonsioriplansweie beis E:dL1I. ll ( P.
2
I wouldnotwant topush thispoint too had, though. EP\ISA, with its higher fiduciary standards arid burdensome
administrative reqmirernents. came in about thesame time.. Growth of real wages also ended at about LhisLime./e have more oianac1ons than weknowwhat todowith.17.
supply pension plans, that is, factors which effectively reduce
the marginal cost of pension contributions below X
The basic premise is tha.t firms have strong incentives
to discourage labor turnover, especially among experienced
workers. There are many justifications for this premise. For
example:
1. Transactions costs in recruitment and hiring make
it desirable to have low quit rates.
2. Firms may have difficulty in estimating the ability
of workers outside the firm. Since employers have greater
knowledge about their own workers than about prospective workers,
there is a cost saving in keeping workers attached to the firm.'
3. Some jobs involve fiduciary or other types of
responsibility. One way to increase the incentives for a worker
to
to be horet (arid not/shirk) is to set aside part of his wages
in a pension, to be paid only if the worker stays on the job
long enough.2
J.Firmsmay invest in workers, teaching them skills
that are specific to the firm. Workers must then be induced
to remain with the firm long enough for the firm to recoup its
investment costs.
'On this, see Stiglitz (1975) and Lazear (1979).
20n this, see Becker and Stigler (l97).18.
Each of these phenomena leads to essentially the same conclusion:
every worker represents a piece of (human) capital owned by the
firm; if he quits, he destroys some of the firm's capital)
Firms will therefore have an incentive to draw up a compensation
scheme that reduces mobility; and pensions are a convenient way
of doing this.
For the sake of concreteness, I will adopt the fourth
item on the preceding list, and assume that firms want to reduce
labor mobility because experienced workers have specific human
capital that is valuable within the firm but not outside it.
As has been well—known since Becker (1964), the worker cannot be
expected to bear the costs of these investments in human capital.
Instead, the firm must bear the costs by paying the worker a total
compensation W that exceeds his marginal product MPt at
young ages. This is shown in Figure 5, where the W profile
is above the MPt profile from age 0 to age
In order to recoup these costs, the firm must assure
itself that it will have the services of the worker for a good
number of years. Since long—term labor contracts are unenforce-
able (and sometimes illegal), the firm must provide a financial
incentive to persuade the worker to remain on the job. One
way to "buy" the desired insurance from the worker is to pay
1Much the same can be said the other way around. Because
of transactions costs, search costs, etc., a firm imposes a














partof the worker's total compensation, intoa pension
fund which remains non-vested at least until the firm has






At this point the firm could vest the pension, and start
to pay the worker his marginal product (that is, follow profile
up to point A, and then jump to profile MPt), effectively
converting the labor contract into a spot market for labor.
But there are strong incentives on both sides not to do th3s.
Since the trained worker is worth more inside the firm than
outside it, there is a rent that can be gained (and shared)
by keeping theworker in the firm. Thefirm still wants to buy
insuranceagainstquits to protect its capital. The worker may
also want to buy insurance against being fired, because his
marginal product outside the firm is probably far lower than
his marginal product within the firm.
• The gap between the workers marginal product within the
firm and his marginal product elsewhere
opens up the possibility for the fsllowing sort of bargain.
The worker essentially "posts a bond" that he will not quit by
accepting a total compensation rate, = + ,whichis
less than MP in return for a promise that the firm will pay
hcen idrctr;inb
exceeds UI) ucil norzo riJ.sn ir'.ex::: ? btwen
t0and t1, so long as h trntatifid On smrlemed viewsf the secfichuman cenital rrohlem, any paths that satisfy the constraint will do. However Hshimoto (1981)
.rgues that uncertainty and asymmetric information (the firms knows the worker's productivity in the firs, the worker knows his alter-
native wage) can remove this indeterminacy.20.
him more than MPt later in his career. (Thus, in Figure 5,
compensation is below MPt until age t2 and above MPt
thereafter.) Workers are encouraged to stick to the bargain
because their wage in alternative employment is even lower
than W .Firms,once they have received this loan from the
worker, have a financial incentive to renege on the bargain.
But workers can easily be protected by seniority rules that
prevent the firing of experienced workers except in the dirost
of emergencies. Besides, firms that want to write long-term
labor contracts in the future will not want to acquire a bad
reputation.
There is onefurtherimportant aspect of this compensation
plan. Under competition, the present discounted value of the
Itoverpa\rments? that the firm makes after age t2 must be
exactlyequal to thepresent value of the "underpayments" it
makes between t1 and t2 .Thatis, if R is the age at
whichthe worker retires:
R
r -rt .' (t_MPt)edt 0
ti
But a problem arises in enforcing this equality: the
worker may not want to retire at age R .(Recallthat he is
being paid more than his marginal product.) If firms allowed
workers to stay on beyond R, they would lose money; so some
mechanismmust be found to mduce retirement atR (or earlier).
Thesimplest way to do this is to include a compulsory retirement21.
clausein the contract. A slightly more subtle way is to make
receipt of pension benefits contingent on leaving the job, and
not offer actuarial increases in benefits to those who stay
at work beyond age R.
To summarize this story, I visualize an implicit long-
term labor contract in which the firm agrees to "overpay" the
worker in his early years, "underpay" him during his mo3t
productive years, and then once again "overpay't him in his later
years. The firm keeps the overpaid young workers on the job by
paying part of their wage into a non-vested pension. In
mid—career pensions become vested, but "underpaid" workers stay
with the firm because (a) their specific skills are not
transferable outside the firm, and (b) the firm makes an implicit
promise to overpay them again later. Finally, the firm must
terminate workers at some point so as not to pay lifetime wages
that exceed lifetime marginal product.
Notice how this rather plausible story violates several
of the stipulations of our Modigliani-ililler theorem. First,
uncertainties about quitting or being fired are central to the
argument. Second, often diverges from MPt.Third,there
is either compulsory retirement or the worker must leave the
job in order to collecthis pension.
What makes this all work
isthe underlying supposition tht along—term contract such
asdepicted in Figure 5raiseslabor productivity. In terms
cu: ca.r'li?r dicuricr.üfctimal tradeaf bt:een pnsr
contributions and straight wages, we can conceptualize this22.
effectas a reduction in costs. If, as seems reasonable, there
are diminishingreturns, the firm' s isocost curves will now be
concave, as shown by AT in Figure 6.(AE is the old isocost.)
Theoptimal pension sizewillnowbe determined by a tangency
suchas ointB, where the slope of AT (henceforth called XF)
is equal to .Presumably,the optimal pension is bigger
onaccount of the productivityeffect(compare points G and B).
The model, makes one other interesting prediction about
the nature of pension plans.Duringthe interval between t2
and R in Figure 5, the firm is paying workers more than their
marginal product. It would like them to leave, but cannot fire
them because of seniority rules or for fear of damaging its
reputation. One thing the firm caii do is offer workers an
incentive to retire early by putting an early retirement provision
into the pension plan which reduces benefits by less than the
actuarially fair amount.
EmpiricalIvidence
How doesthis scenario hold up empirically? Very well;
I think. For one thing, private pension plans generally make
—-sometimes as long as 20 years-—
workers stay with the firm fora considerable period/before
vesting their pension rights, or rather did so before ERISA
or 10
establishedm.a>:imurn vestinp per1oof5/ years. Thus pensions
traditionally havebeen used to reduce labor turnover. Further-
more, i investment in specific human capital is the major
motivotorifor reduoir turcvcr (a I have22a.
ft
a P23.
supposed), it is difficult to imagine the investment period
(to in Figure 5) being more than a year or perhaps two.
If this is so, then time t1 in the model should be no more
than 2-'4years.Yet it had been common to make workers wait
10-20 years or more before vesting. Thus the vesting age
exceeds t1 ,assuggested by the model.
Another fundamental precept of the model is that the
wages of experienced workers are far higher in the firm than
on the outside. In a detailed empirical study of the wages of
older men, Cordon and I (1980) found strong evidence in support
of this notion. We had a large longitudinal sample of white men,
which, after some cleaning up of the data, offered almost 16,000
observations on men between the ages of 58 and 67 in the years
1969, 1971, and 1973. Of these, about 10,000 cases were
working men (and hence gave wage information) while 6,000
cases were retirees. We made an econometric correction for the
selectivity bias inherent in the problem,1 which turned out to
be important, and estimated that a worker would suffer a
substantial wage loss if he changed jobs late in life. The
following example is indicative of our results. Consider an
industrialworker with a .5—year work bistorv the last 20 of
hioh have been spent with his current emnloyer. According to
1Specifioally, workers that randomly draw "goo&wages will tend to stay at work longer. Hence, as the sample ades,
wage rates for the working population tend to grow relative
to potential wages among ret 2ees.2L.
our estimates, if he changed jobs today his wage rate would
decline about 2% (assuming neither job had a pension).
Interestingly, if he was covered by a pension plan on his current
job and switched to a job without a pension, the corresponding
loss of wages would be 3%. These are large wage losses which
create strong incentives to stay with the current employer.
Another crucial part of our story is the hypothesis that
wages exceed marginal products late in life--and probably by
increasing amounts in older ages. Here, our empirical efforts
were less supportive. While our estimates ratified the basic
qualitatmve conclusion, we obtained a rather small quanttive
effect. Specifically, we guessed that, in jobs with mandatory
retirement, the second cro3s±ng point in Figure 5 (age t2)
came 10 years priorto the mandatoryretirement age (age R)——an
arbitrary choice needed to define an empirical variable. We
then presumed (a) that the variables in our equation (experience,
education, occupation, etc.) measured MPt, (b) that W
at age t2, and (c) that the divergence of W from MPt subsequent
to age t2 was linear. Our econometric specification offered an
estimate of the rate at which the two paths diverge, which
4- r')C' • 1 turnedcuL to beonly u.3 per year (with standarderror0.15-a).
Thiswouldleadto a mere 33% gap Letween W and MPt at
retirementage--a rather small difference.
ordindri lea5t suar'.cstimce wese.bout 0.5%
perye6r.25.
However,there is lots of casual evidence suggesting
that firms want to encourage older workers to leave the job.
For example, virtually every private pension requires that the
worker leave his job if he wants to collect benefits. For
workers who elect to stay on the job anyway, few private pensi.on
plans offer fair actuarial increases in future benefits as
compensation for the loss of current benefits. Often there is
no increase at all. Lest this financial incentive not prove
sufficiently strong, about 60% of pension plans have a compulsory
1 . re-Lrementprovision.Thus staying on thejob past age R is
eitherprohibited or discouraged, asthe theory suggests.
On -Lheotherhand, most private pension plans allow
early retirement.
2
Indeed., plans typically encourage early
retirement by not reducing benefits actuarially for those who
opt for early retirement. Consequently,, the present discounted
value of pension benefits is often decreased by staying at
3 . . work. This is just what we would expecc firms to do if
exceeds MPtfor older workers,as in Figure 5.
L1,The Economic Effects of PensiorL
Section 3beganwith a frictionless wc;ld in which the
existence or nonexistence of private pensions was only a bookkeeping
1See Skolnik (1976).
2Specificall.y, in1977,6% of all planis, covering 82%
of all workers with pensions, had some rrovision for early
retr'nt——sencinellyte 5) 1 9.See Ycr)CSrnitli
(f on't'hcom
3Forexmpi?Lazca.r (1981)foundthat thiswas true in
a study of the prcv sionsof 2Lt1cfthelargest penscnp1ns in tLcountry. 11cgave thisfeet, however,a cii fferertinterpretation.26.
detail. Pensions were neutral. But once webroughtsuch
factors as uncertainty, risk aversion, capital market imperfections,
taxation, and specific human capital into the model, reasons
for having pensions appeared. Pension benefits became imperfect
substitutesfor straight wages, forcedpension saving became
animperfect substitute for voluntary private saving, and pensions
couldalter the lifetime profile of labor supply.
4.1 The Use and Abuse of the Envelope Theorem
Butsomething seems amiss here. Pensions arevoluntary
arrangements entered into by mutual agreement of workers and
firms. How,then,can a pension alter anyone's saving and labor
supply decisions? Pensions should be "optimized out" and hence
incapable of "affecting' anyotherendogenous variable. Saying
that a private pension "affects" an individual's savings
seems, on the surface, about as meaningful as saying that a
person's purchases of pastrami affect his purchases of sauerkraut.
In particular, ifwe makethe following assumption:
A6: Jobsvaryin the mix between straight wages and
pension contributions, andalsoin the natureofthe pension
plans; but there isafull rangeofchoice for every worker.
thenthe I4odigliani—Millertheoremforpensions still holds
atthemarginevenwhenallthe previous assumptions (Al-A5) are
relaxed. If ABholds,thenpensionplanswill beadjusted
tomar ), 1 a SIuiri ill FiguLe 7;hencepensionc will be
irrelevant(at: the e!ar*ri)q-27.
Itis easy to see that this is so. Suppose there isa
continuumoffirmsthatoffer the same total compensationper
hour,W ,butthat package it differently between straight
wages, w,,andpension contributions,Pt .Insuch a market,
workerswill asign themselves to the firms whose wage-pension
packagescoincide precisely with their own preferences. Optimal
sorting means that every worker locates himself in a firm with
a pension plan that makes the marginal dollar ofPt precisely
equivalent (to him) to the marginal dollar ofw (i.e.
He will see to it that hisPt stream is not so large that it
makes himsubjectto binding capital market constraints that
forcehim tocurtail consumption early in life, and he will
select a firmwhose compulsory retirement date (if any)
correspondsto his ownpreferredretirement date. Thus in full
equilibrium = =
Ifa flthe irn portarrt Drovisionsof the pensionplan
(benefitlevels, retirement date. etc.) can he chosenontimally
by the worker subjectonly toactuarialfairness constraints
imposedbythe firms, then the pensionplan willbe irrelevant
to_other_decisions since, atthe margin,there will he no
difference between pension contributionsand straight wages.
self select ion by workers will insurethat 1 for all
workers,and free bargaining willinsurethat = for
all workers and fixms who contract witheach other.
The importance of assumptin AS then. isquite clear.
hute hc u 'i not becCduc2d bytL cai elop: thec:eo. The
fact is that AS is not a goodapproximation tothecho:ices28.
actually available to workers. Workers do not have complete freedom
to choose their pension plans for several obvious reasons:
1. Heterogeneity: Both workers and firms differ in ways
that make theiroptimal pensionplans differ. Some workers are
more risk averse than others. Some want to save more for their old
age.than others.Marginal tax rates and age obviously differ.
Expectations are heterogeneous among workers and among firms, and
may differ between a worker and his employer. Firms differ in the
amountof specific human capitalthey require, and in other respects
listed on page 17. The list could go on and on. Clearly, each
worker and each firm ili have a different concept of the optimal
pension.
2. Transactions Costs: Real resources are involved in
setting up and administering a pension plan. These costs are largely
fixed costs. Therefore it is simply impractical to tailor a
pension plan to every worker's specific needs. Furthermore, if
pension funds are to avail themselves of the advantages of portfolio
diversification and economies of scale in purchasing annuities,
they willhave to beof substantial size.
Thesecs;ects uthereal world, which aresooften lost
sight of ineconomictheory, imply that any particular worker will
haveonly a finite number of choices. Only by luck will hiown
O)LJjh1Lpensionplan be among these. Most workers will have to
cco amo 1 ans that are suboi..timal inoneor more respects.
Forc'amin. thehesavailahean may recuire him to save a
more t1n he wants to or to retire a little earlier than he29.
would like to. Any such departure from his optimal ilan implies
that 1 for him, and exacts a cost in terms of attainable
lifetime utility.1 Yet the worker may still prefer to accept the
pension plan rather than reject it (if he has that choice) because
of the infra-marginal benefits from the plan. That is, the
workermay be better off with theplan than without it, even
thougha different plan would he better still.
For example, consider the worker whose indifference curves
have theshapeindicated by II in Figure 7.Find the point (W in
thediagram) where theslopeof the indifference curve is unity.
This worker would like to find a firmwhosetechnology gives it an
isocost curve that looks like AF. But maybe none exists. Or,
even if one does, it may offer the pension indica-ted by points B
orC instead. At B,the worker's > 1,so hewould like a
biggerpension. But he still prefers BtoA (no pension).
Similarly, at C he would prefer a smaller pension since <1,
but may still prefer C to A. He_therefore accepts the firm's
pension plan as given.
In this sense, the characteristics of a pension plan——while
apparently open to free choice---retain some aspects of exogencity
to most workers Loosely speaking, each firm will attract a labor
force such that the of its median worker2 is equal to its
own .Thismeans that some workers will have X>X
t W F
andothers will have < A..Workersclose to the median worker,
however, shouldhaveapproximately optimal pensions (XAr1).
'The recent de'7eoTment af SO—cTJ... eJ tccer:i. 1ti ,nljh
allow workers to enoose somecf the choractenistics atJiele ,LXSiCfj
can he seen as a responsetothis arohlem.1-loweva ,myimpression
is that such plans are not jet prevalent.
2Ttisnotstrictly the median : rker thatcallsthe tune





However,even this limited amount of optimality evaporates
once we recognize that the pension plan is only one of many
attributes of a job, and may be far from the most important of
these. In addition to the wage and pension, workers care about
such factors s fringe benefits, the nature of the tasks to be
performed, flexibility of hours, geographical location, and many,
manymore. Given that workers and firms are heterogeneous, and
transactions costs of various kinds exist, the worker cannot
optimizeover every dimension of the job choice, but must choose
among a small number of discrete alternatives such as B and C in
Figure 7. Therefore, he may find that his optimal job does not
even have the pension that comes closest to being optimal for
him(because,for example, he prefers a job with an inad1uatepension
that inVolVeS less commuting time). In extreme cases, it is
even possible for a worker to accept a job where the pension plan
does him more harm than good. In this more complicated (and
realistic) world., even the median worker in each firm may not
achieve anoptimal pension (Xwi) and firms may not be able to
balance pension benefits and wages precisely (XE. 1).
The result of all this is that whenwe look at datafrom the
real world,we are seeing a market eilihrium1 in which some
workersare on jobs in which they would like to see the pension
11f labor markets are not in equilibrium,as they certainly
areriot at any particular time, things aremore complicated still.
Manyworkerswillnot even he on t:he job that is best for them
whenall aspecte of job choice are considered.31.
raisedbecause for them > other'workers are onjobsin which
they would like to see the pension reduced becausefor them
X,only a few workersare on jobs in which the pension plan
is approximately rightfor them (); andX may depart
fromunity in many firms. These harsh realitiestell us that
thevalue of cannot be deduced from economictheory (whereas
it must always be 1 in the frictionlessworld), but must be
estimatedempirically.
Our empirical work suggests that thesenotions of
transactions costs, heterogeneity,anddiscrete choice may be
important.
First, our estimated wage equation took theform:
log(w., + XrP.)f(X.;)+ E.4 IJit iL 1L
where is the marginal valuationparameter just discussed,
X1 is a vector of determinants of marginal product (like
age,education, experience, etc.),is a vector of Parameters,
and c.is a stochastic error term. Ourempirical estimate of it
was on1 0.52 (with standarderrorO.ll)—-a surprisingly
lownumber inasample of men aged 58 and older.1 itreally
suggeststhat workers do riot succeed in"op1imizing out" their
Pension plans.
Other interesting findiagssuggest, however, that some
considerable sorting doesgo on. According to our empirical
1
Thereis, o CC)ur'se, the OS51J)Litythat:errors—in— varj.c; bias in severe n thiscase!e cei te esl:iseLe . SOP Cdcfl indvdua1from data th:t ecrc ometsrie32.
wageequation, workers with pensions have substantiallY higher
wagesthanworkers on jobs without pensionS, evenafter all the
obviousdeterminants ofuaes (education, age, occupation,
health, etc.)arecontrolled for. In addition, our empirically—
estimated resrvatiofl wage equation impliedthat workers with
pensions differed systematicallyfrom workers without pensions
in their labor—leisure preferences. Having apension seemed to
serve as a proxy for a propensityto want to retire around age 65.
Workers with pensions really seem differentin some unmeasured
1
way.
The tentative conclusion——and here I reallydo want to be
tentatIve--is that the optimal sorting procesSthat brings the
envelope theorem into play probablyis operative in the real
world; but it is nowhere near complete.Hence most workers end
up with tsuboptiniall! pensionswhich may, therefore, affect their
saving or labor supply decisions.It is to these decisions
that I turn next.
.2 Pensions and Saving Decisions
I begin my analysis of the savingdecision in the simple
case where the Modiglani-Mlllertheorem holds, and build from
there. Thus assume initially that pensionsdo not affect the
lifetime pattern of earnings in any way(including the retirement
decision), that there are no capitalmarket constraints or tax
distortions, arid that saving is motivatedsolely by the desire
iameIoigan jnfoJr oo that pooploin th2 Parod7 of
Income Dynamics who have pensiOnS aremorelikely to planfor
retirement.33.
to finance retirement consumption. It is easy to see, under
these circumstances, that each dollar of pension savings must
displace exactly $1 of fungible saving. Hence private (funded)
pension plans have no effect on national saving: the worker
saves in the pension fund and dissaves outside it. But social
security, because it is unfunded, will reduce national saving on
a dollar-for-dollar basis.
Figure 8 tells the simple story. Line BBis a budget
line for a consumer who lives two periods. Point E1is his
endowment point, corresponding to earning y0 jn period 0
("youth") and y1 in period 1 ("old age"). Point E2 is the
endowment point in thepresenceof a pension which withholds
y0-x0 and earns the market interest rate, r. Clearly, the
individuals optimum point, A, and hence his consumption in
each period, c0 and c1, cannot be changed by the pension.
Now for some complications. First consider a constraint
on borrowing that makes points on BB to the right of the endow-
ment point unobtainable. There are two possibilities. Figure 8
depicts a case in which pension savings are inframarginal.
Theworkr doesnot wantto'ocate to the right of E2,andso
thecapital market imperfectionis irrelevant. For such
individuals,the simplestory remains intact. Consumption decisions
and utility are unchanged by the pension.
But Figure 9 shows a case in which the pension imposes a
bindingcapital marketconstraint. The individual's optimum
pointmoves fron A (an interior maximum) to F2 (acorner), as



















Nonetheless, retirement consumption still rises owing to
what is, in effect, a TLumpsum payment equal to DB in the figure.
Panel (b) portrays the corner solution where the pension
forces the individual to save more than he otherwise would.
This time, c falls to and saving rises. c1 rises to
hut utility may rise or fall, depending on how large the pension
is.(In the diagram, utility rises.)1 The critical thing to
notice is that ifthepension contribution were $1bigger,
c0 would be exactly $1 smaller; that is, private fungible saving
(which is constrainedtozero) cannot change, so each dollar
ofadditional pension saving translates into an additional
dollar of total private saving. Expansions in private pensions,
then, raise national saving while expansions in social security
have no effect on national saving.
Thus even before bringing insomeother interesting poss-
ibilities--that pensions might change the retirement age, that
some saving might be for bequests or forprecautionary motives,
etc.——wesee that theory cannot resolve the issue,rfheimpact
ofboth private pensions and socialsecurity on nationalsavings
is an empirical issue. Several points areworth noting in this
context:
1.Thepresence ofa governmentally-imposed social
securitysystem makes it that much morelikely that the forced
savingsinherent in private pensions mightnot be inframarginal,
andmight subjectworkers to binding capital market constraints.
This ii lustrat s au aIie pctnt .Awr']o:fliC gi:i
froma pensionplan thatissuhoptinal.36.
Thusfull displacement (at the margin) of private fungible savings
by either public or private pension contributions is made less
likely by a large social security program.
2.Social security wealth is quite large for the typical
individual. Gordon, Wise, and I (l981a) found that, for a typical
white man aged 60-65 in 1971, social security wealth amounted
to about 7% of life-Lime earnings. By comparison, private pension
wealth amounted to only about l% of lifetime earnings, and all
financial assets (including life insurance) averaged about 3%
of lifetime earnings. Thus social security wealthwas, on
average, twice as large as financial wealth.
3.The tax distortion favoring pension savings is quite
large (as Table 1 showed),suggesting an income effect which is
hostile to saving (Figure lOa).
Now for some further complications. First, a pension plan
might induce the worker to retire earlier than he otherwise would.
I have already suggested in Section 3 that private pensions are
likely to have this effect. If so, workers will put away more
money for retirement. Many people have also claimed that social
securityinduces early retirement. Myreasons for doubting this
claimare explained in the next section. O hiorice, however,
thispossibilitymilitates against displaoement ofprivatesavings
bypensions.
Second, there is the bequest motive for sav.ng. If
pensionsentail an income effect, as I have suggested they do,
orkerb itb a bequest motive ma be induced to raise thair desired
beruet, and c.nce to reducc their private furigible saving by37.
less than the previous analysis suggests. As is well known,
Barro (l97) has argued that this effect is so strong that social
securityhas no net effect on national saving. We need not take
the argument to extremes, however, to realize that it, too,
militates against full displacement.
Third, in a world of uncertainty in which a need for
financial assets ma.y suddenly arise and borrowing possibilities
are limitedand expensive,iliiquid pension wealth may be a very
poor substitute for private fungible wealth. This again leads
usto expect that $1 in pension wealth offsets less than $1 in
fungible wealth. Inthe case of social security, however, there
isat least one factor that points in the opposite direction:
social security provides indexed annuities, which are virtually
impossible to buy or the private market. For this reason, $1
of social security wealth may be "worth" more than $1 in private
retirement savings.
For all these reasons, and others I have not mentioned,
theory will tell us little about how much private fungible
wealth "should be" displaced by $1 of social security wealth cr
$1of private pension wealth. But we should not be surprised
if displacement is rather small.
Before considering the econometricevidence that we
have obtained, it 15 worth looking at the stylizedfactb.
Comprehensivenationwidedata on private pension contributions
hyemployers are available 10the national ineome accout
forthe years i9'48—l979.38.
as a fraction of disposable income
and are depicted/in Figure 11. This was a period of great change.
In 1948, pension contributions constituted only 11% of personal
saving. By 1979, they accounted for 64%. Yet over this 30-year
period the ratio of personal saving to disposable income (DI) showed
no trend. Over the first five years of the period (1948-1952)
it averaged 6.02%; over the last five years (1975-1979), it
averaged 6.33%. As the ratio of private pension contributions to
DI rose from 0.84% to 2.94%, the ratio of private nonpension
savings fell from 5.18% to 3.39%. This crude look at the data
certainlymakes usthink seriously about dollar-for-dollar
displacementasa serious possibility.
contributions (excluding Medicare)
Social security/also expanded rapidly over this period,
rising from o.g%ofDI in 1948 to 64 % ofDI in 1979. Yet,
privatesavings did not fall. At least at the level of crude
empiricism, social security does not appear to have displaced
private saving to any great extent.'
Now the previ.ous twoparagraphshardly constitute a serious
empirical look at the displacement issue. Gordon, iise, and
myself (1981a) set out to see what could be learned about the
displacement of nonrension savings by private and public pension
saving from a large cross-sectional samole of people near
than
retirement ase. But, the task turned out to be far more difficult/ we
'This ou1dappeartocontradictthe well—known time se.riesresults of cidsteiri (l97, 1980). In fact, Feldstein's
results ars open to serious question (see Leimer' and Lesnoy
(1980 •1981)).Andnot even Fel cisLeinhasaiirported ofind
c:m icrcnt in the sostiar reri ad0
c











imagined. Frankly, I thinkwe failed to measure the effects we
were interested in.But the reasons forourfailure are instructive.
Ourvehicle for investigating individual savings behavior
was the life-cycle hypothesis (LCH) of Nodigliani and Brumberg
(l951).Under certain simplifying (but quite standard) assumptions,
this modelcanbe written as:
T
1 —t z(l+)N. +B (A+Y )(l+r)
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=0
where t is age, At is assets, Y is the discounted present
vaiua of earnings from age t f r rd (human wealth), N is the
number of adult equivalents in the household ]-ien the head is
aget,Bis the number of adultequivalent years of consumption
plannedfor the bequest (assumed to depend on the number of
children, but not to very with t), and iis a constant embodying
both discounting and any desired growth trend in consumption over
the life cycle.
The interpretation of (4.l) is straightforward. The
lefthand side is the fraction of original lifetime resources
at remain a;aiiable at age t. The denominator of the righthand
side is the number of aduit equivalent years of consumpcion
rro1)opl discounted arid eiri000yine any desired trend) in the
o cot .re I e cod e ;end thenumerator is•uhe correspondin
eot fcr.;or . (i just
nrt mci 1ifc1:imc niann n.'40
Our original idea was to investigate the effects of private
andpublic pension wealth on private fungible wealth by disaggregating
At into financialwealth(A), private pension wealth (PPW),
social security wealth (SSWt),and net holdings of real estate










Our experience in trying to estimate (14.2) was sobering.
First,welearned that tThelikeliheod function was amazingly
flat considering that our sample had over 4100 observations and
thatthere was plentyof variance in all the independent variables.
Thedatahad very little abilitytopin down the parameters of
the lifecycle theory, even though the theory was very tightly
parameterized,leaving fewcoefficientsto he estimated.
Second, the ability of the estimatedmodel to account for
cross—sectionaldifferences inassetaccumulation was trivial,
asindicated by the large standard error of the regressionand
the miniscule
Third.weallowed fortheposihility that——contrary to
whatwouldhe exuected from the LCH—-the planned consumption path
declined abruptly in old age. We did this by replacing N1
in the numerator of the ratio in (4.2) by 1N1 ,where-y 'ias a'41.
parameterto be estimated. The point estimate of ywas0.'4S
(with standard error 0.19), suggesting eitherthatthe marginal
utilityof consumption shifts down sharply in old age or that
people are not saving enough to finance their utility-maximizing
consumption streams. Frankly, I lean toward the latter
interpretation
Inbrief, instead of using the LCH asthe maintained
hypothesisand learning about the effects of pensions on private
saving,our results cast serious doubts on the validity and
usefulness of the LCH itself. It may be tha-L economists have
accepted this theory too readily.
I have not yet mentioned thepoint estimates of and >2
Weestimated =0.39,meaning that each $1 of socia' security
wealth displaces 39 of private wealth, and so increases the
ridvdua±'s total wealth by 61. (nut national savings falls
by 39,becausesocial securityis not funded.) Butthe
standard error of this estimate was a whopping Q.145, making rt:
easy to resist any temptation to draw inferences about social
security. This imprecision was further evidenced by the fact
that minor vniationson the basic model led ta wildly different
estimates of .Theparameter is simply not well pinned down.
The estimate of X2 ,thedisplacement parameter for private
perlsions,was even worse. The point estimare was —0.30 (standard
i.5,meaningitiaL edch $1 of private pension welth
Le=dn to 31i more in private furigible wealth. The ) otefor i:1cs1aLa althl ta*nec 1he nc:nr enL 2.
It is worthdwellingon these perverse, findings for a
minute. We. certainly do not believe that, holding everything
elseconstant,a rise in pension wealthor in the value of real
estate leadstoa risein financialasset holdings. The problem
isthat, try as we may, we cannot hold everything else constant.
There are pervasive positive correlations among all assets in a
cross section of individuals. Econometric techniques try to
break these simple correlations by partiallingout pertinent
variables. Chief among these is lifetime resources, and cur
proxy forthi.selusive variable was better than most. But even
oursmay not have been.good enough (for example: wehadno data
oninherited wealth).
A second unmeasured variable is the "taste for saving,"
which probably differs substantially across individuals. Even
holding lifetime resources constant, people with a high taste
for saving will have high A and high andhigh REt
leading to negative estimated and in economeLric models.
We. are not the first empirical investigators to humn our heads
against the wall overthisproblem. And we will not be the last.
On balance, we found very liti]e evidence to suggest
important displacement of private nonpensicn saving byeither
public or private pensions. But, far more significantly, our
research raises questions about whether economists have been
posing this question in the approrriate way. It may well he
that the life--cycletheory,tor all its appeal, isnot what
nvc':rs:n:ividnainavrsn ecisinn .Sd'''ir toruesLsfor
or4nsurance against unforeseen contingencies seem to be the
leading comoeting hypotheses, and they deserve a fuller airing.
14.3Pensons and RetirementDecisions
I have alreadynoted reasons why aprivate pension plan
might alter aworker's life—cycle pattern of labor supply arid,
in particular,hisretirement date. The same arguments would
seemto apply, with even greater force, to governmentally-imposed
pensions like socaI security. In this section I consider what
simple economic theory has to say about the retirement decision
inthepresence of public and private pensions, and summarize
some of our empirical findings.
RetirementDecisions with No Pensions
Tohighlight the effects ofpensions, I begin witha case
in which there isnopension. Figure12 isastandard labor--
leisure choice diagram with only one wrinkle, which I add for
greaterrealism. I assume that theindividualhas only limited
ability to vary his hours, so that points onthedotted portions
Dfwhat we normally think of as hisbudget constraint (AD) are
notavailanle.1 Theheight arepresentsthe annuity-equivalent
oft1e worker's assets; andthe slope of BC is the after—tax
wage, Severalindifference, curves are shown inthediagram;
1aume the higher lettersindicate older ages.
Threethings nay hapeen as theindividual ages. First,
agingmay cause the ind ffeie.nce map to shift in a way that is







unfavorableto work, as shown in the figure.1 Second, at
probably rises overtime.2Third, may fall. Each of
these factors shifts the worker's optimal choice toward shorter
hours.Eventually, some workersfind that the best choiceis
tojump abruptlytopoint A,that is, to retire (see indifference
curveI I ).cc
This analysis is quite simpleminded. So are its observable
implications.It leads us to expect that workers are more likely
to retire if they are older, sicker, have more assets, or have
lowerwages. it also implies that retirement will probably
come later in jobs in which wages do not fall late in life
(professionals?) and hours of work are more flexible (i.e.,point
Bis further to the right). You probably did not need a diagram
to convince you of any of these.
Private Pensions
Things get slightly more interesting when we acid a private
pension. First assume that, once the worker reaches the age of
eligibility, the pension plan offers a fixed annuity, b. Figure 13
shows the budget constraint that becomes applicable on the day
of gihility.Ifhe stayson his min joh he does not receive
ttie pension benefit b.So his budget constrant is the relevant
port on;of TAD. To collecth, he must leave his main job, hut
t rtire from the labor force. I assume that the
•lterriati'e job avai able late ii ife offers the option of working
fe;iec hours ,butaysI coer uagu , .ThIsis indicated h
This need net be for 6 Li workers .Somenever' retire I am dealing here with those that do.




, Fthe relevantportions of TEHC. Theeffectivecomposite budget
constraint is CFH plus theisolatedpoint E.
Asthe indifference curves shift through time (andat
rises), the individual may, depending on the position of GH
arid the wagew , stepdown to a lower paying job and work
shorter hours (an optimum on segment FH). Or he may retire from
the labor force completely (point L). Clearly, complete
retirement is more lakely (a) the larger the pension, (b) the
larger the gap between W and w ,and(c) the higher the
minimum hours of work on the secondary job (the further to the
left is H).
Nowlet us corinlicate the nature of the pension plan.
In many plans, an additional year of service raises the pension
benefit. Thus a worker eligible to draw an annuitybt today
may face a choice between continuing to draw bt forever if he
retires today or drawing some higher annuity,bt+1, if he works
another year. In that case, he gainsb but loses the actuarial
present value of the annuity htv_b beginning next period if
he retires today. If bt+1_b is big enough, there is an
incentive to stay at work.
In other pension plans, bt+i may not depend only on
whcther you work today, hut also on how much you work. For
example, some defined benefit plans fix the annuity as a fraction
of average earn ings over chc last, say, 5years.In this case,
te ma:ina1 ioturr1Lufiia-cJjt:cnensien,46.
andthe incentive to remain at work rises commensurately.
Figure.offers an example of what the budget line for such a
pensionmight look like. In the figure, it is assumed that
benefits are based on earnings in the best five years of the
worker7s ca.rcr andthat yeart becomes one of the best five
years when leisure. falls below L* .Theeffective budget
constraintbecomes CYFI1 andpoint E .Comparedto Figure 13,
thischange in the budget constraint obviously ehcourages more
work.
Figures 13 and 14 make clearthat wehavequite a few
possibilities, depending on the precise nature ofthe workerts
indifferencecurves andthe exactwages arid hours available on
thetWC) jobs. Ue cannot even tell whether, other things equal,
a worker with a pension will retire earlier or later than a worker
without a pension. In situations like Figure 13, pensions
encourage retirement. In situations like Figure pensions
discourage retirement.
Buthere weshould recall our earlier analysis of pensions
(Section 3). An employer concerned with labor turnover, I argued,
is likely to design a pension plan that discourages retirement
that comas "too early" (say, while the worker' s marginal product
is still above his wage) but encourages retirenent later (once
theworker's wageha.s risen abovehis marginal product). Hence
workers may find that their pension plan confronts them with a
situation like Figure l at (so they stay on the job arid







retire). An example of such a plan would be one that bases
benefits on earnings between the age of vesting and t2 (refer
back to Figure 5 on page l8a) and then offers no actuarial
compensation fcr postponing retirement beyond t2
This would seem, by the way, to be an efficient employment
arrangement in that it inducee greater labor supply during the
years when liPt is higher.
Social Security
In adding social security to the analysis, I first deal
with a worker who has no private pension. Later 'I bring both
pieces of the puzzle together.
It is often stated, and wZdc,ly believed, that social
security provides strcng work disincertives for workers over 62
years of age. But Gordon, Wise and I (l98),in studying the
actual budget constraint created by the law, discovered that this
conventional view is almost totally wrong. Let me explain.
The conventional view that social security' discourages the
work effort of older workers is based on two perceived problems
with the law. First, benefits are subject to an earnings test
which implicitly-taxes earnings beyond an exempt amount at a 50
percent marginal rate. Second, actuarial adjustments for those
who defer benefits are believed to be insufficient, so the
expected present value of social security benefits declines the
longer one stays at work. According to the conventional view,
the social security law sets up a budget constraint like that in















security.Distance 1Sthe potentialsocial security benefit,
which can be received as long as hours of work do not exceed T-L0.
(Thelaw exempts a fixed amount of earnings,X,so L0 is X/Wt.)
At higher hours of work effort, the earnings test becomes operative
making the putative net wage only (segment BC). Finally,
beyond point B, earnings are so high that all social security
benefits are foregone and the effective budget constraint reverts
to BD.
IfTECBD really were the budget constraint, social security
wouldprovide work disincentives for many workers.But itis not.
What'swrong with this conventional view? First of all,
thosewho workto the leftofpoint C, andhence lose benefits
to the earnings test, are given compensat ion in the form of
higher potential benefits in later years. Legend has itthat
this compensation for deferring benefits islessthan actuarially
fair.For workers between the ages of 65 and 72, this is true.1
Butfor workersbetween theages of 62 and 65, the current law
oftenprovidescompensation which ismorethan actuarially fair.
Thatis, those who deferacceptingbenefits are given in compensation
arealannuitywhichhas an internal, rate of return above the
realinterest rate.2Notice thatpreciselyfair actuarial corrccton
would meanthatthe effectivebudgetconstraint would continue
1Thoseover 72 arenotsuejecLtothe earnings test, and
so the issue doEs not arise.
toMc l 77 amend-ents ,actuaria.lcCmDensat:ion took
thc IOf0 nO ( efcr,r [P1r1(rrj
I
roLe——itwas acre thaneetuarsa ly fair weeri flOTS) na Ji:a teswc'ce
low,but less -uhan cc tuar. ally Fair whenoem i.na Ii rates were high.
Forfurtherdetails, seeBlinder,Cordon and Wise (19800 19 iJD)p4g.
beyond point C, as indicated by the dotted line in Figure 15,
because benefits reduced b the earnings test would be given
back in subsequent years. With such a budget line, social
security provides an income effect hostile to work—-but only to
the extent that lifetime benefits exceed lifetime taxes. (While
this has obtained until now, it is unlikely to remain true for
very long.) Nore important is the observation that social security
creates no substitution effect, and hence no tax distortion.
Now consider the other aspect in which the conventional
view errs. Students of the sys-Lem have failed to apprecate
that, from its early days, the social security benefit formula
had mucb in common with the private defined benefit plan depicted
in Figure ]i-.Specifically, one' s entitlement to social security
benefits has always depended on covered earnings in some
particular years. For example, in recent decades the earnings
base has been defined as the best N of the previous N+5 years,
where the value of N has varied from year to year, hut has
been as low as i and 22 in 1981.
That this effect sets up a convex kink as in Figure lL is
easy to see. Suppose Y is the lowest earnings igure now
included in your earnings base. Once your current hours of work
exceedUt each addit local hour cf work pay: an add:i.tional
re-LOOninme form of mmgreu tuca soco security cenefets
base
because it raisan tha osociege'. Ocodon, Wise and I (l?Oh )
compu cad this mp1ici L.:agesubsidy for a. sample or men wooso.
reached age 65 in 1975. At a 1% real interestrate, the subsidy
averaged5% of thewage rate for amarried man with a spouse
benefit, or 26% for a man alone. The 1977 amendments reduced
thiseffect somewhat by indexing old earnings figures.Gordon,
Wise,and I estimated that if our sample of 65year olds in 1975
had been subject to the post-1977 law, theaverage nercentage
wage subsidy would have been 36% for those with spouse benefits
and 16% for those without.
Thus, for a worker between his 62nd and 65th birthdays,
the typical budget constraint does not look anything at all like
Figure 15. instead, it probably looks like TEFG in Figure 16.
(Figure 16 assumes, for simplicity, that actuarial correction is
exactly fair. )Once hours of work pass , the effective
V1t
wage rate jumps abruptly.
For workers over age 65 things arc more complicated since
actuarial correction, while no longer trivial since the 1977
amendments, is certainly less than air. Figure 17 shows two
possibilities, depending on whether is above or below the
mountof exempt earnings, X.If Y0 is below X, the
effective budget: constrairt ia TEFCHI. Apart from incomeeffects,
it is hard to see where work dis±ncentLes might arise. The
only segment on which social seocriy miget lower the effective
wage is OH, and even here things could go the other way. If
is above Z , then the eifect ye budget constraint is rITCfhi
on which e h'rce de in ito i a ric( ec' noe C -ir'-' -1
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possibilities for substitution effectshostile to work effort
seemquite limited.
SocialSecurity_withPrivate Pensions
By now you have probably read enough to shy away from a
comrlotctaxanomy of the variety of possibilities that arise for
a worker with both a private pension andsocialsecurity. I
certainly shrink from the task, and so will deal with just one
case that I think is ofconsiderableimportance. Think of a
worker between 62 and65whose private pension looks like the
simpleoneinFigure13.(His boss wants him to quit.) Then
thebudget constraint createdby social security for himif he
stays on his main jcb is TtFG, in Figure 18a. If he quits to
take a secondary job, his budget constraint will be TEfg instead.
Because w is lower than the slope of Ef is less than
the sLope of AF and point F must come at lower hours of work than
point f.(Each is the point where the exempt amount of earnings
is achieved.) This leaves two possibilities, as shown in Figures
18a and l8h. Figure 18a is meant to represent a tvsmallT
private pension; the two buiget linescross (pointQ)somewhere
on ecgrrftnL AF. The composli a budget constra irit facin., the worker
is therefore TEQEC and the worker has these possibilities:
(a)a corner solution at E•--•full rot irement;
(b) a tangency on5crntOE--prtial retirement on a
coca cny ion





















































Look at this diagram, and think about what indifference
curvesin this space might look like. It seems quite plausible
that a worker might jump at some age from a tangency on GF
("fuiltime work") directly to point F (complete retirement)
withouteverspending time on FQorQE. Certainly, tangencies
"near" F or Qareruled out ifindifference curvesare convex.
rIheotherpossibility is that the pension is so "bigt
thatthe two budget lines cross somewhere on segment CF. This
caseis shown in Figure 1Gb. The composite budget constraint in
this case is TEQC. it would ahpear thatjumpingfrom fulitims
workdirectlyto retirement is evenmore likely in this case.
Noticethatat point Q the wage drops from well over to
Since is likely to he quite a bi.t lower than \J,thiscould
easilyrepresent a halving of the wage rate.
But, of course, Figure 1Gb represents only one of a
variety of possible composite budget constraints. The nature of
the social security budget constraint depends on family structure,
the earnings history, age and other factors. Private pension
provisionsvary enormously. The real lesson of this section
isthat, for workers covered by private pension plans,wehaverio
hopeof araling their labor supuly decision Ly apr:copri etc
econometric techniques until wek now same. of the details of
theirplan (how are benefits defined? what is the age of
eligibility?are there actuarialrewards or penalH cc for
postponing retirement? etc. )Just kriowrig that The worker
doec nct aver. trd1ur .rn)r Larawa or ieer;
likely to retire ,thaugho i aris there ic a hint that53.
retirementwould be Jesslikely untilsome age (perhaDs the normal
retirementage) and morelikely thereafter.
Empenicel_Evidence
Thistheoretical discussion provides the background for
theempirical workonthe retirement decision that Gordon and
I (1980) did. Here are some of the lessons wetookfrom 'the
theory,and which guided the design of our empirical work:
1.Private pensions are quite likely to encourage retire-
ment at or before the normal retirement age. Sone will discourage
early retirement; others will encourage it.
2.Atleast so some eten-L. workers self—select into
jobs with pensions that suit their preferences, and hence
vo1untan3J7 subj ec-L themselves to the incentive structures set
up by these plans. There is thus reason to suspect that people
with and without priva-Le pensions have different tastes.
3.Social security creates a complex multiarmed budget
constraint (especially when it interacts with a private pension)
which distorts labor—leisure choices in many ways. However,
if the ecrker is free to vary his hours, these distortions are
very unlikely to encourais conrIeteretirementiftheworker
understands the co:rplco:i ties ofthelaw. For this reason, we
didc'i to concentrate on the retirement decision, ]eaving the
more d ffcult hours-of—work decision to more intrepid
econornetriciens.
- ii)
houssdecision .SeBlinor ,Gordonand Wise (177 i ).Subsequently,
di. '2I €:OL iO'i S vC';'Olj''LC0 VOICo.S LI..
.Peopleare more likely to retire completelyfrom the
laborforce tha.n to stepdownto a secondary job when the gap
between their current wage, and their alternative wage,
is levee.snoted earlier, we estimated this gap to be quite
large.Jethink this helps explain why, in our sample of men
aged52—57 in 1973, 60s werefullyretired, 3% were working
fulltime.(35 hours mer week ormore), and only 6% were working
shorthours
5. Firm-specific human capital provides one important
reason wuV — migho belarge. 1L also provides one
importantrationale for pensions. Thus we expect —w
to he raruicularir large on ohs with pensions. Our empirical
work verified this suposl.tion.
The model we estimated was a frictionless utility—maximization
model ,inwhich utiliry functions differed across individuals
(thouul all were CES) and social security was assumed to be
irrelevant tothe r'ctiromontdecision. We then added to this
model some ad noc variables meant to "pick upu any effects of
social security that e'e might have ignored.
The model was quite successful in separating retirees
from workers. The samrle itself (all white men) ranged in age
from 50 to 57 and was nicely divided between workers (about 10,000
observations) and retirees (about 6,000observations). The
the"if—I—had—it—to—dc--over—again" department, nn T ;oPieves and l—— r.v''L irkLow oor
oon'ionecnt a,' suic m' ,ainceit enabled as to tr:iL 'rthe
ut ilitv function into a ee servet Jcrj wage ience ion end then simply
compare'rb( YC'J1100''CLutheirarke 'sage. however, I
Iiavepr eve Ccuoo'oe hou': it :','Ca S 0 SIC.55.
model assigned a probability of being retired, P, to each
observation. We defined a retiree as "correctly classified"
if >.60,as "incorrectly dlassified" if P c .110,andas
"not classified" if .'&O c p1 c .60. Similarly, a worker was
"correctly classified" if .110 and "incorrectly classified"
> .60.By this criterion, the model correctly classified
77% of the observations and misclassified only 12%—a-even when
data on actual wage rates (which are available only for workers)
were ignored.
The main social security variable that wri added to the
model was the ratio of social security wealth to lifetime earnings.
The idea was that scme workers who t:ould like to retire might
be liquidity constrained and forced to postpone retirement until
they reached 62. At that point, the availabilitj of social
security benefits would "induce" retirement. (Note that if this
story is correct, social security actually made these workers
postpone retirement.) This liquidity effect should be strongest
for those whose social security wealth is largest relative to:
their lifetime earnings. The empirical variable obtained the
theoretically correct sign, but an economically unimportant magnitude.
The other way we "looked for" hidden social security
effects was to allow the utility function to shift (for no good
reason) at ages 62 and 65, the ages of eligibility for partial
and full benefit3. In fact, the data did not want to p1t in a
shift at age 62, but did put in a small one (a 6% jump in the
reservation wave) at ace 65. This ii;ht he a social recurity56.
effect atage65.However, it is worth pointingout that the
onebad mistake made by our model was that it "retired"many
65—67year olds who were still at work. Missing importantwork
disincentivesfromsocialsecurity would have led to the
opposite error--keeping aL work those who actually retired.
Allthings considered, the empirical work did not give
us any reason to reject che theoretical supposition that social
security does not encourage early retirement.
Estimatedretirement effects of private pensions were
inane interesting.\Je used our model to compare a. worker with a
private pension to an otherwise identical worker without a pension.
The estimates suggested that a aorker with a pension (hut no
mandatory retarement clause) is very siiahtly less likely to be
58—60 slrehtiy more iskely ye be retired atages retired at ages/I 2iIirlfhiuch mono likely to be retired at
ages 65—67. These findings seem to conform with theunderlying
theoryof pensions outlined in this paper.
Several other findings of the model bear on issues raised
by the theory. First, the estimated consumptionleicure
indifference curves were very flat, suggesting a huge wage
elasticity to the retirement decision.Second, and quite
surprising to um, theestimatedincome effect on labor supoly
was quite small. This throws cold water onwhat had previously
been mypersonalfavorite explanationof the trend tcuardear]icr
11t also suggests a huge elasticity ofhours of workwith ye coe-t to wage rates .Flatindifference curves areeonsistet iacL-ncr:d
wunYerm eiiior wasIm Lu1J LJJICcai!uaL alL.055) 50.0 thatdata onhours of work is:! eyed no role in the estimation!etirement: the income effect of rising rcal wages. I am not
yet ready to dismiss this explanation because otherevidence
doessupnort a strong income effect on labor supnly. But it
must be admitted that the early returns are not encouraging.
5. Wh' Gc'vernment Intervention?
So far in this paper I have developedsome positive
economics of pensions. In this concluding section, 1 turn briefly
tosornunormative questions. What, if anything, does the theory
have to say about the many ways inwhichthe. government intervenes
in the naISiCnsystem?Can these interventions be rationalized?
I start with two important provisions of UJSA.
5.1 Why Imnose Fundinc Peauirements?
ERISAenforcesminimum funding recuirements for private
pension plans. This may seem strange since several finance
specialists have pointed out that there is a tax advantage that
i many
encourages overfundin of pensions.In fact, 4arge corporations
apparently have overfunded their pensions.2Why. then,would the
overnmentbother with minimum funding requirements?
Sesmack(1930) alid iepper (l98i
rifl 97)58.
The answer,I think, is obvious. A number of firmshad
either gone bankrupt, leaving insufficient assets to pay off
their unfunded pension liabilities, or had otherwise reneged
on their pension obligations. This prompted Congress to act
Indeed, since there is a tax advantage to overfundirig, one does
suspect that underfunders may he seriously contemplating
running out on their pension liabilities. Thus we can think of
funding requirements as a type of consumer protection legislation,
and with this advantage: for "honest" firms, the legislative
constraint will he nonbinding, and hence costless. Not a bad
polacy, it would seem.
Of course, the usual economist's response to consumer
protectlon legislation can be invoked here: why not just require
firms with unfunded pensions to label them as risky assets("Warning:
This pension may be hazardous to your financial health.") and
let the market take care of the rest?2 The question carries
its own answer: anyone who is not an economist finds this
suggestion utterly absurd!
5.2Whylmrose Vesxin, Reauirements?
EkISA also imposed maximum periods of time that can elapse
be-fore vesting. It is much harder to defene this provision.
The model presentedin Section3 assgns an important and useful
roleto pensions whichare not vestedimmediately. If firms must
I.
iarc backgroundo th i c earn Ic. a f rror star' ice
sacdunctt (ar,:hcc' cccs
Ofcourse, a -true faa-c- marketeer aesid rio-i: eve-ri manda:e.
the lahclli:gr cquirc:sente .Therca]:et 'ear: t eke care of Ii :at too59.
pay for specific human capital formation, then a nonvested pension
is a way to tie the worker to the firm long enough for the latter
to recoup its jnvestment. Banning such arrangements will inter-
ferewith specifichuman capital formation and harm economic
efficiency.
5.3WhyLimit_Mandatory_Retirement?
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act limited the
right of firms to impose mandatory retirement ages for their
workers, and there h-as been discussion of banning mandatory
retirement entirely. Everything I have just said about vesting
applies with equal force here. I argued in Section 3that
mandatory retirement may be an integral part of an optimal
laborcontract. Disallowing such a provision may make the
wholeoptimal compensation scheme unravel.'
Thevesting and mandatory retirement issues are related
to the "time inconsistency" problem so much discussed in recent
macroeconomics.2 Atthebeginning ofthecontract, workers and
firms might both agree that a period without vesting and/or
a mandatory retirement age are part of a Pareto optimal
compensation package. After some time has elapsed,
however,the worker may be able to reap a windfall gain
byimmediate vesting or by ahrogatirLg the mandatory
'For a different model leading to the same conclusion,
seeLazear(l79)Twoobser•vatiori temner this conclusicn: First
(as iaVc:alrcadj , ]::cinirn:;(JCi LO:io plan) ran oe us-J toin'Lce.[ci: i erc Lidfl 1c.c7 rEt Limcflt is
banned. ccond, the rrendatc;ry ratc:menL ccnstrajnt maybe 1inding
onlyfor o mincrN.y of :kc
2The seminal paper was Kydlend andPrcscott(19 /)60.
retirementclause. The standard way out of time inconsistency
problems is "precommitmont," and recent legislation has interfered
with the freedom to write contracts with precommitment.
5. WhyHaveSocial Security?
The private economy is perfectly capable of generating
pension plans, and does. There are no apparent externalities
involved in having a pension.1 Why, then, should we have a
publicly-imposed pension scheme?
Iwould like to begin by suggesting two good reasons having to
dowith redistribution of income.Thefirst pertains to redistribu-
tion across_generations.We must not forget that the social
security system was a child of tieGreat Depression.:f we
ccmceptualze the Groat Depression as a terrible random event
that severely damaged the economic ueii-beingof several
generations,then it makes sense to transfer
income from generations yet unborn to the generations that were
damaged by the.. Depression. One way to do this was to start
an unfunded social security system.
The people who retired in -the earl.y years of the social
security system (say, thosewho reached age 5 in l9tO)were 5L
orso when the Depression began. For them, the Depression
represented a huge and irreparable loss of lifetime income.
It is not something they could have been expected -to have prepared
iut ee Aro;cLtlt;eT(121) d cf
externel ity relating to labor turnover is identified and analyzed61.
for, nor suhsec1ucntly made upfor.The social security system
madehuge transfers to these people, who had contributedvery
littlebut drew substantial benefits. It thustransferred some
of their DCDrCSSIOrilosses to unborn generations. \'as this
bad social policy?
Moving downa generationor so, people who reached 65 in,
say, 1960 wcse 30 when the fleuression started—-just entering
their peak earning years. They too suffered huge losses of
lifetime income, and received huge transfers from social security.
It takes a long isme for Ilie "s tart upti period of a
social security system to end. Dvei the cohorts that reached
age 63 as late as 197U—3975 were victims of the Great Depression
to a significant degree. These people were only 19_214 years old
when therecession bean.,butwere29—30 when it ended. The
incidence of unem1oymcnt must have been particularly severe for
them, depriving them ofworkexuerierice that would have been
valuable in their subsequent careers. Most of these people also
received large- lncome transfers from social security.Only when
the system IS fully mature will intergenerational transfers sto.
By this time, most of the peeple damaged by the Great Depression
will have died, having receiveda lifetime wealthincrement from
socialsecurity.
Thuscomrensaticnfor the Depression can provide an intellectually
defensiblecase for a rublic rension system and, in
articwiar, for an unfunded public pension sjstem. Whether
'But every timesobstaritial Iricresec in benefits ismade,
it is as if a med ?j11J cyst,:;.t i 'Lsa 'a. "Thesut of
-thesystem
thutericncfl 'sra iiiLiriçlit in 1972 wili not
"rraure'tuntilafter 1 heyear 202062.
this rationale actualy had much to do with the establishment of
our social security system is more debatable. A plausible view
is that itcontributesto the explanation of why social security
began when itdid,but not- •Lo the explanatcn of why social security
exists at all. However, I think the redistribution—across--
generations argument goes a long way towad evsi =inng why he
system is not funded.
The second reason for having social security has to do
with iePistrihution within an age cohort. It is well—known
that the social security benefit formula is redistributive--
people with lower lifetime income earn higher marginal (and
average) returns on their social security contributions.
Though the benefit formula has changed many times, this redistrihutive
aspect has been present from the earliest days of the system.
I neecJ not outline the case for equalizing redistribution
of income. No one who now opposes redistribution will thereby
be persuaded to change his mind. But if redistribution is
accep Led as a legitimate function of government,asI think it
should he, then a rationale for a public pension system appears.
Surely, we cannot expect private pensions to redistribute income.
But why use pensions at all? Why not redistribute by programs
like progressive taxation and transfer pajmnts, and make
social security distrihutionally neutral?
There are two answers to this question. First, people
from lower econonci.c strata have worse mortality experience.
Sicc they Co nut l1u as long on aucrage ,lower'irccue groups
have to he gi 'ena higger' e.nnu ty nor Collar or "ocrnribut j0fl
justto mehe thesystemsoteanially feir. leccal socialthe
securityis virtually/only mechanism we have, to redistribute
lifetime income. All other redistributive devices, at least
in part, take from the transitorily rich and give to the
transitorilypoor. Thile current income and lifetime income
arc surelypositively correlated,that correlation is far from
pcrf act. If \..YCtakeit for granted that what wewantto
redistribute is lifetime income, then a redistributive social
securitysystem hasmuch to recommend it 1
Of course,thisview of howsocialsecurity redistributes income
seesonly thesilverlining and ignores the cloud. For one thing,
theincome concept redistributed by social security—-earnings in
coveocci employmsntis far from ideal and leads to certain
distrihutionel. anamolies for example, "double dippersIt whoare
rich in a lifetime sensemaynonetheless take much more frcm the
system then they contribute). Another problem is that social security
does more than just redistribute fromthosewith high earnings to
those with low earnings, it also redistributes across demographic
lines in ways that somepeople.view as capricious. (For example, it
subsidizesoneeanierfamiliesthrough the spouse benefit.) Many
of these redistributions would not necessariiy be applauded by
a concave social welfare function.
A third argument for social security has nothing to do with
redistribution, but rests on the idea that pensions are a desirable,
but highly risky, as set. According to this argument, workers would
like to •:icithemselvesci the risk ofpovertyduetolongevity.
But a private pension plan organized by the emnloyer only allows
t e uo hoe to oreJo ri oh for ntb risk: Jo risk t!ot
'e would all like:eistn Thute lifutime utility. Lifetime
ncorlian1ncrf t ofor 1 r 1ct r' il 1cor
.rieJ udinp ims'.r.ec i ono in tIe capital marketHowever, lifetime income i.e nrobebly a hotter proxy than current income.6i.
thefirm will gobankrupt.A public pension scheme eliminates
these firm--specific risks and provides a safe asset.
This rationale for social security may not be very persuasive,
however. First, ifthe company fundsthe pension plan completely,
hiresan insurance company to administer it, and vests benefits
promptly, then the workertspension benefits are well insured
agoins-!:the risk of bankruptcy. Second, even if these steps are
not taken, the risk argument provides an argument for publicly-
supported pension insurance, not for mandatory public pensions.
A fourth argument for social security is that a mandatory public
pension scheme might correct what otherwise would be a market
failure. An ingenious argument hothiseffect has recently been
made by Eckstoin, Eichenbaum, arid PelecI (1982). In the context
of on overlapping generations mode:L inwhichindividuals have
private information about their survival probabilities, they
establish, first, that a free market in annuities need not lead
to a Pareto optimal outcome and, second, that the market equilibrium
with a mandatory social security syeterr may Pareto—dominate the
free-market solution. This argument thus provides a potential
rationale for social security based solely on efficiency considerations.
Finally, I conic to the rationale for Socialsecurity that
I im:rgirie is most important in the publicarena, but that economis'
have so much trouble with: paternalism,pure and simp1e. One
reason for the establishment of a mandatory, nubilepension
system was the poli-t:ical judgment that peoplewere not proveding
"enouph" foI-Lhelr own retirement. That -Lb :1s Sta. c iron-
si ten-i: with the theory of reveeledpreference has not diminished
force ir the world of affairs65.
6.Summary
I began this paper with an ambitious list of questions to
which I promised tentative answers. Here, as tersely as Ican
putthem, are the answers suggested by the theory of pensions
developed here:
1.Whyare there private pensions? Because of tax
advantages,and because pensions are a useful device for reducing
labor turnover.
2. Whyhave they groc.n so much in recent decades?
Because the tax odvantage arc a postwar phenomena:, andhave
increasedover time, while the risk of pension fund bankruptcy
has dcc] med..
3. Why do they have tb-c features that they_doi
Manyof the salient features of private pensions can be
rationalized as part of an optimal long-term labor contract in
a.n uncertain world in which labor turnover is costly (for example,
because firm—specific human capital is important).
14 How can rivate nunsioms "affect" other economic
decisions? Because—-owing to heteroeneity, transactions costs,
and discrete choice——many workers cannot ontirnize their pension
plan. This makes the pension at least partly exogenous.
5. Whet crc the cfects of pensions_on savings end retirement?
Theory does not necessarily support the obvious supposi-Liom that
pensions lead to early retirement; it suggests thatprivate
pensions are more likely to have this effectthanscolal security.
barboa üeo:., tellus Law mu oh a Is lacamcnr o I -.'ac un ci bie
sdvings by public endprivatepension we should expect66.
5. Have_recent rublic-policv_intveticnsintheriva.te —-
andother fiduciary
pens ion systems made sense? Minimum funding /rccuirements can be
rationalizedon grounus of consumer protection. But limitations
on thevestingand mandatory retirement provisions thatmayarise
fromfree bargainingprobablyimpede the abill :y of workers and
firms to formulate optimallabor contracts.
7.Whydo we:oaarndatory_social scour it7 system?
Totransfer income to the generations damaged by the Great
Depression; to redistribute lifetime income within an age cohort;
to 'oid cfr veYoi e for retirement saviots; ant because Conzress
(iaternalstcalJv) tecoded that eoe1e were fl•L enou1s
fortheir own retirement.
In olcsin0, I ucold like to ca3 1 attention to an
importants lizod fact andposeonemore question. The thot
is a simole and compelling one: prior to the advent of cn1
secur:Lty, the private ension system in this country w:s
negligible; for one reason or another the prcva:e market had
not produced Oer:.sic SIC.The is a profound coc: Was
the nonexistence of private pensions a case of market failure,
which the social security system then corrected? Or is the
whole private pension system the rroduct of a tax ditorticn
that berne important only after World War II?I suggest chat
the aner tothisquestion is terribly important to our actitudes
to'.ard the pension zy ten. dut I do not pretend to hrcn•2 The
all 3.5Cr.6.
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